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Abstract
Space Station Freedom's power system, along with
the spacecraft's other subsystems, needs to carefully
conserve its resources and yet strive to maximize
overall Station productivity. Due to Freedom's dis-
tributed design, each subsystem must work cooper-
atively within the Station community. There is a
need for a scheduling tool which will preserve this dis-
tributed structure, allow each subsystem the latitude
to satisfy its own constraints, and preserve individ-
ual value systems while maintaining Station-wide in-
tegrity. The value-driven free-market economic model
is such a tool.
1 Resource Allocation
1.1 The Need for Load Scheduling
Many similarities between Space Station Freedom's
power system and terrestrial power utilities are ap-
parent. Both systems incorporate generation, storage
(usually a pumped water reservoir for the terrestrial--
batteries for us), transmission lines, circuit breakers,
and power consumers. Both systems rely heavily on
human decision-making for safe, economic operation.
But, the strategy that controls the operation of the
two systems is fundamentally different. This differ-
ence arises at the power supply.
In terrestrial utilities, ample generation is usually
available for the demanded loading; when it is not,
power is purchased from the grid. The control strat-
egy is to modulate generation capacity to match the
demand's changes. Any shortage is covered by inter-
change with the grid. Every effort is made to meet
the consumers' demands by managing the injection of
power into the transmission network, controlling the
loads themselves is reserved for extreme failures when
there is no acceptable alternative.
Freedom has no tie-line to a neighboring utility. The
control strategy is to maximize solar energy conver-
sion with energy utilization controlled by adding and
deleting loads from the system. This in turn requires
that the load demand be as determinate as possible so
that each watt can be allocated. Although this proce-
dure maximizes payload productivity, it generates an
extremely difficult scheduling problem [1].
Scheduling the electrical energy among the con-
sumers is a resource allocation problem and would
seem amenable to a host of mature operations research
algorithms. However, Space Station Freedom's de-
sign is evolving as a confederation of separate agents
(life support, communication, propulsion, payload 1,
etc.), each with a responsibility to perform a unique
function. Structuring the electrical resource allocation
problem as a constrained maximization of some objec-
tive function oversimplifies the interactions with the
rest of the infrastructure. The real issue is to max-
imize the collective welfare of the various functional
agents. This implies bargaining among the power re-
questers and the power management agent to produce
equitable allocations [2].
We note that managing the electrical loads is no dif-
ferent than managing loads applied to any subsystem
aboard the station. If Space Station Freedom is to op-
erate coherently as a confederacy of separate agents,
some of the agents will necessarily have the authority
to determine the behavior of others. For the present,
who directs whom is contentious. We propose to de-
fine roles and responsibilities for participation in a dis-
tributed bargaining transaction that will yield a pro-
ductive allocation of Freedom's resources through load
scheduling.
1.2 A Cooperative Approach
1.2.1 The Project Management Paradigm
There is a strong parallel between managing the au-
tomatic operation of Freedom and managing complex
projects involving human beings. The conventional
wisdom for the latter uses a systems management ap-
proach to control and coordinate a project's activi-
ties. This contemporary theory of organization man-
agement uses a project manager to coordinate the en-
tire operation. This manager's legitimate authority
is based on participation and persuasion with the in-
dependent agents and is not based upon the unilat-
eral exercising of power. In this context, the decisions
are made by the individual functional agents and the
overall success depends upon the integration of these
decisions. The project manager basically monitors the
interfaces, mediates conflicts, and negotiates equitable
trade-offs among the various agents [3]. The basic
behavioral recommendation in this philosophy is to
establish cooperative alliances both among the indi-
vidual agents and between an agent and the project
manager. This conceptual framework for cooperative
and hegemonic relationships is the basis of our pro-
posal for automating the cooperative problem-solving
among the Electric Power System, its consumers, and
the the station's operations manager.
1.2.2 The Paradigm Applied
The various agents for Space Station Freedom can be
organized into three categories: 1.) the operations
management agent--OMS 1, 2.) resource managing
agents--those which supply basic resources through-
out the station, and 3.) resource requesting agents--
those who plan to use the resources to perform other
functions. Under the project management concept,
each agent is allowed to make all the decisions about
controlling any of the activities under his purview. Re-
source requesting agents .will plan activities according
to what is considered an acceptable discharge of their
responsibilities. This action will request resources to
be supplied by the resource managing agents who or-
ganize to support the desired activities.
Conflicts arise when more resources are requested
than can be supplied. Rather than have the opera-
tions management agent decide directly which tasks
1OMS--the Space Station Freedom's Operating Manage-
ment System--performs the automated coordination of syst_rr_
and payloads
will be performed and which will be curtailed, the re-
source managing agent with the conflicts should ne-
gotiate with the resource requesting agents to develop
mutually acceptable allocations. The idea is to in-
crease the span of control of the individual agents
and to reduce the number of layers in the manage-
ment hierarchy [3]. The elimination of intermediate
hierarchies and direct micro-management should sim-
plify automating resource allocation. Of course, to do
all this, the participants will need some knowledge of
what constitutes good and bad operation from the op-
erations management agent's point of view, and the
operations management agent will have to be con-
cerned with issues of equity among the participants.
This conceptualization requires:
1. A two-level hierarchy. Decision-making agents or-
ganized by function who either plan what is to
be done or who manage the required resources
constitute the bottom level. An operations man-
agement agent who integrates the decisions and
resolves deadlocks constitutes the top level.
. Explicit value systems. Decision-making agents
use cardinal measures of preference for trade-offs
among different resource consumption tasks to
maximize station productivity and to preserve eq-
uity among the resource requesting agents.
. Local constraints. Resource supplying agents
schedule demands using only the constraints in
their own subsystem. Resource requesting agents
plan activities that do not violate any of their op-
erating constraints.
In this type of operation, the resource requesting
agents plan activities that require resources. The op-
erations management agent polls the requestors and
compiles integrated resource utilization schedules and
sends them to the resource suppliers. In general, re-
source allocation is constrained by the amount of re-
source available at any instant, the time at which a
resource is needed, and the priority of the need itself.
Choosing a schedule of events that satisfies constraints
implies the ability to use a value system to make the
selections. The value system used rates these deci-
sions according to their impacts upon overall station
operation as well as preserves equity for the partici-
pants. These equity notions and preferences for over-
all station operation are determined by the operation
management agent and communicated to resource re-
questors who eliminate resource conflicts by using this
preference structure to revise their requests.
We use a free-market concept to organize the co-
operative bidding for resources and to coordinate the
RESOURCE
PROFILES
FREE-MARKET
COORDINATOR
TRIAL
PRICES
SUPPLIERS CONSUMERS
POWER
PAYLOADS
THERMAL
LIFE SUPPORT
ETC.
HOUSEKEEPING
LOADS
Figure 1: Free-Market Transaction Cycle
convergence upon an equitable allocation. Using a free
market for the exchange of goods and services provides
a natural and easily comprehended environment for
experimenting with supply and demand.
1.2.3 Free-Market Economic Model
The transactions among our functional agents are co-
ordinated with the familiar concept of a free-market
economy. Shown in Figure 1, the operations manage-
ment agent, the OMS, acts as a free-market coordi-
nator to mediate conflicts and to provide a top-level
value system. The resource management agents--the
suppliers, are concerned with maximizing the use of
their resource without violating any of their operat-
ing constraints. The resource requesting agents--the
consumers, are concerned with generating sets of pre-
ferred operating profiles for their desired tasks. Each
of these participants coordinates his actions as if op-
erating in a free-market economy. The free-market
coordinator sets initial trial prices for all the resources
over the planning horizon. The consumers then gen-
erate their preferred usage profiles incorporating their
own value systems, the top-level priorities and the re-
source costs. The suppliers, using their system-level
constraints, evaluate the resource profiles and set fair
prices for each resource throughout the planning hori-
zon. This exchange continues until the fair prices
quoted for each resource equal the trial prices used by
the consumers. This partitioning of constraints and
value systems preserves the notion that each agent is
most interested in and most knowledgeable about his
own part of station operation. An additional advan-
tage of this approach is that it solves one of the most
difficult scheduling problems, inter-system scheduling
requests. Realistically, most consumers will demand
several resources for each operation (any request for
power will contain the hidden request for heat rejec-
tion). Most resource schedulers generate solutions for
a single resource and hope to partition the problem
among different schedulers. To us the cooperative ap-
proach is more appealing.
2 A Value-Driven Approach
2.1 Generalized Lagrange Multipliers
The theory behind the free-market economic approach
is the Generalized Lagrange Multiplier technique [4].
Everett showed that Lagrange multipliers can be used
to solve maximization problems with many variables
without any restrictions on continuity or differentia-
bility of the function being maximized [5]. While tra-
ditional Lagrange multipliers deal with equality con-
straints and handle inequality constraints with slack
variables, Everett's GLM techniques do not use slack
variables. The goal of GLM is "maximization" rather
than the location of "stationary points" as with tra-
ditional Lagrange multipliers. The following is a sim-
plified discussion rather than a rigorous mathematical
description. For such information refer to [5] and [6].
Our approach is to perform an unconstrained max-
imization of the following Lagrangian:
L(z) -" _i E [Vivljzij - E At¢txlj
• j k
where:
V_ = overall value of the i*h project
vii = relative value of the j,h mode of the i th
project
xq = 1 if project i is performed in mode j
z_j = 0 otherwise
and subject to the constraint
S] -<
i i
where ¢_(zlj) = the amount of resource con-
sumed by mode j of project i
and C_ = the total amount of resource k
available
The I_ values are determined by the operations
management agent--the OMS, and are used to incor-
porate top-level, station-wide preferences among the
various projects. The vq are the preferences deter-
mined by the consumers for each operating option that
they might choose to have scheduled. The key to solv-
ing this problem is choosing the Lagrange multiplier.
Instead of solving sets of simultaneous equations to
find Ak at a stationary point, we choose an initial value
for each Ak. This choice corresponds to the trim prices
set by the free-market coordinator. Finding the max-
imum of the Lagrangian using these assigned values
for A_ will optimize some problem. The issues are to
find what problem was optimized and to adjust ,_k to
optimize the problem at hand. Finding a maximum re-
quires that the objective function be concave" around
the solution point or else the algorithm will skip solu-
tions [5]. Fortunately, most real-world problems either
have an objective function that is concave or can be
made concave in the area of interest.
Our application of the GLM technique follows the
transaction cycle depicted in Figure 1. The consumers
evaluate their options using the trial prices, Ak. They
will choose the option with the greatest overall value
(Yivo -_.k AtCk). The free-market coordinator aggre-
gates each consumer's profile by resource, i.e. all the
power requests over the planning horizon are added
together, all the thermal, etc. These aggregated re-
source profiles are then sent to the resource suppliers.
The suppliers have their own system level con-
straints that must not be violated• Some of these
are hard constraints, constraints that must be met
or there is no feasible solution. The total amount of
power available is a hard constraint. Some are soft
constraints, constraints that may be violated, reduc-
ing payoff but not producing an infeasible solution.
An optimum battery charging profile that preserves
battery life is a soft constraint. For hard constraints,
the resource demands would be added over the plan-
ning horizon; and if there were an excess, the fair
price would be lowered--Ak would decrease. Corre-
spondingly if there were a shortage of a resource, the
fair price--and Ak, would be increased. Most power
system constraints will be soft constraints dependent
upon time-varying factors. Soft constraints are eval-
uated using penalty functions (Section 2.2). With ei-
ther type of constraint, the resource suppliers generate
a set of fair prices over the planning horizon.
The fair prices for each resource return to the free-
market coordinator who uses them to modify his next
set of trial prices. He compares the fair price and
the trial price at each time interval and adjusts his
trial price proportionally and according to the sign
of the difference. Since the objective function is con-
cave around the solution point, such an incremental
adjustment of Ak will avoid large oscillations during
convergence.
Another important consideration for optimization
techniques is their ability to handle large problems
without suffering from combinatorial explosion. The
separability of the Lagreingians makes the GLM tech-
nique's solution time vary proportional to pqlog(q),
where p is the number of variables and q is the number
of constraints, whereas, standard linear and non-linear
2A function is concave at a point if all values of the function
are less than the values of a line tangent to the function at that
point.
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Figure 2: Cost Function
techniques vary porportional to p2q [4]. For large ap-
plications such as Space Station Freedom, this is an
important advantage.
2.2 Penalty Function
For soft constraints we modify the Lagraagian in Sec-
tion 2.1. Instead of having resources that are strictly
available or unavailable, we have resources whose price
increases with scarcity and decreases with abundance.
We control the usage of such a resource with a penalty
function so that we avoid operating at extreme supply
levels. This leads to the following equation:
)L(x) = _-_Vivijxij - Pj(y)dy
3
where yj(z)= _-']_iC/(zi)
YJ (z)--the amount of resource j used
The penalty function, P)(y), is a non-linear func-
tion. Integrating PJ(Y) over resource consumption Yi
generates a cost function such as shown in Figure 2
for battery charge. This cost function is used to gen-
erate the fair price quoted to consumers--prices which
will coerce the consumers into changing their preferred
project profiles.
Each soft constraint will be represented by its own
penalty function and cost function. Figure 2 depicts
percent of battery charge as the constrained resource.
For this particular case, there are appropriate intervals
where the battery state-of-charge is known and can be
compared to desired values. At the end of the orbit's
sunlight portion the battery should be fully charged.
To determine the cost of power for a given sunlight
portion, the energy demand is calculated and used to
determine the battery state of charge. The cost func-
tion supplies a fair price for power usage during that
sunlight portion. Correspondingly, at the end of the
orbit's eclipse portion the battery depth of discharge
should not exceed 35%. After calculating the energy
demand over the eclipse portion and determining the
battery depth of discharge, the cost function will sup-
ply a fair price for power for that eclipse portion.
2.3 Value Functions
For this scheduling algorithm to satisfactorily allo-
cate resources among consumers, the values Vi and vii
must simulate the human managers' preferences for
choicesamongalternatives.Aspreviouslydiscussed,
the station-widevalues(V/)arepassedto the con-
sumersandusedin theirdeliberations.Thestation-
wideimportanceof anoptioncanbemadeafunction
of timeandusedto representurgency.
Projectmanagershavetwobasictypesofcriteriafor
judgingwhentoscheduleaproject;therelativeimpor-
tance of that project and the urgency of project com-
pletion. The relative importance would most likely be
a numericM value, whereas the urgency would be more
like a rate. The value function might be represented
mathematically as follows:
V(t) = V0. e°'
where V0 represents the importance factor and a rep-
resents the urgency factor.
The placement of a project in the schedule would
depend on both its importance and relative urgency
for the time periods in question. The value function
could be used to indicate the urgency of continuing a
relatively low-importance experiment that is very near
the completion of a several day operation. The con-
cept of urgency being applicable for specific time pe-
riods in an orbit or mission is something intuitahly
obvious but not necessarily easy to implement. In
the GLM technique additional equations representing
time-dependent value functions do not complicate the
solution because of the separabilty of the Lagrangians.
Each consumer will still evaluate his project's options,
choosing the one with the greatest overall value, only
his method of calculating that value will include time-
dependent factors rather than a single value for the
entire project.
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3 Goals
A design prototype will be available in the summer of
1990. This prototype, using a 386 machine, OS/2 and
Presentation Manager, will depict these concepts for
Freedom's electric power system and a few represen-
tative consumers. We will use this prototype to solicit
evaluations of our approach from the Space Station
Freedom community. Our long term goal is to incor-
porate a more detailed version of this software into
the Space Station Power System Test-bed. This test-
bed work will provide a foundation for Space Station
Freedom's operation as a distributed yet cooperating
collection of entities.
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